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Mullane: Constitutional Law

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SAN DIEGO COMMITTEE AGAINST
REGISTRATION AND THE DRAFT v.
GOVERNING BOARD OF THE GROSSMONT
UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT: PUBLIC
FORUM ANALYSIS IN THE HIGH SCHOOL
CONTEXT
I. INTRODUCTION

In San Diego Committee Against Registration and the
Draft (CARD) v. Governing Board of the Grossmont Union
High School District, l the Ninth Circuit held that an anti-draft
organization's first amendment right to free speech was violated
when it was denied the opportunity to place anti-draft advertisements in a school district's high school newspapers. 2 The
court's holding was based on its determination that the high
school newspapers constituted limited public forums. 3 The court
held, in the alternative, that even if the school newspapers constituted non-public forums, the School Board of Grossmont violated CARD's first amendment rights because its exclusion of
CARD's advertisement was unreasonable and constituted viewpoint-based discrimination.· The district court denied CARD's
request for a preliminary injunction against the School Board.1I
1. 790 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1986) (per Reinhardt, J.; the other panel members were
Goodwin, J.; Wallace, J. dissenting) [hereinafter San Diego CARD).
2. Id. at 1478.
3. Id. at 1476.
4. Id. at 1478.
5. Id. at 1472 n.l. The advertisement depicted a ghost·like figure, stating "Don't Let
The Draft Blow You Away!" The following statement appeared below the figure:
Know Your Rights!
Know Your Choices!
If the draft starts wmorrow, you could be in boot camp 11
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The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded"
II. FACTS
The plaintiff, San Diego Committee Against Registration
and the Draft,? sought to purchase advertising spaces from five
student newspapers published by high schools in the Grossmont
School District. 8 The School Board denied the plaintiff access to
the newspapers on the ground that the advertisements constituted advocacy of an illegal act.· CARD filed an administrative
claim with the Board seeking a reversal of the School Board's
decision. 10 This claim was denied. ll CARD then brought a civil
rights suit 12 in the district court seeking a preliminary injunction against the Board.13 The plaintiff alleged that the Board violated CARD's rights under the first and fourteenth amendments by denying CARD access to the advertising spaces while
granting access to military recruitment advertisers. I f The district court denied CARD relief, determining that CARD had
failed to show either probable success on the merits of its claim
or that it had raised a question that was sufficiently serious to
days later.
Call or Write: Committee Against Registration and the Draft.
735·7518. 238-6878
P.O. Box 15195
San Diego. CA 92115

Id.
6. Id. at 1481.
7. Id. at. 1472. CARD is a non-profit organization consisting of student and nonstudent members. The organization counsels young men on alternatives to compulsory
military service. Id.
8. Id. CARD's request for access to the advertising spaces was ultimately given to
the Superintendent of the School District to issue a policy guideline. Id.
9. Id.at 1473. See infra note 23.
10. San Diego CARD. 790 F.2d at 1473.
11.Id.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) states in pertinent part:
"Every person who, under color of any • • • regulation . • • of
any State • . . subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States ••• to the deprivation of any rights. _ .
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceedings for redrell8.
Id.
13. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1473.
14.Id.
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warrant issuance of a preliminary injunction. 1G The plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
III. BACKGROUND
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution
states, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech . . . . me The right to free speech and expression has
been considered one of the primary rights of our democratic society - "the touchstone of individual liberty"1'1 - upon which
nearly all other forms of freedom are conditioned.18 Freedom of
speech is fundamental to our dynamic society, for the right "was
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people,"lI' which is "one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart
from totalitarian regimes. "to
However, the first amendment's freedom of speech is not
absolute. 21 Restrictions have been placed on speech, and the
courts have determined that, in certain situations, an individ15. [d. The District Court found that: 1) The student newspapers were limited public forums. 2) The military service advertisements that had appeared in the student
newspapers were non-political and offered vocational opportunities to the students. 3)
The School District policies permitting publication of political speech by students only
and restricting newspaper access by non-students to commercial speech were reasonable
in light of the purpose of school publications. [d.
16. U.s. Const. amend. I.
17. See J. NOWAK. a ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTlTUTIONAL LAw 857-64 (2nd ed.
1983) (hereinafter J. NOWAK). for a historical background of freedom of speech.
18. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319. 327 (1937) (assertion that neither liberty nor
justice would exist if the first amendment freedom of speech did not apply to the states).
rev'd on other grounds. Benton v. Maryland. 395 U.s. 784 (1969).
I!!. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254. 269 (1964) (quoting Roth v.
United States. 354 U.s. 476. 484 (1956». See generally Emerson. Toward a General
Theory of the First Amendment. 72 YALE LJ. 877 (1963).
20. Terminiello v. Chicago. 337 U.S. 1. 4 (1949) (ordinance, as applied to petitioner.
violated right of free speech).
21. Dennis v. United States. 341 U.S. 494. 503. 581 (1951) (discussing the history of
free speech cases). See J. NOWAK. supra note 17 at 857-1027; M NIMMER, NIMMER ON
FREEDoM OF SPEECH, A TREATISE ON THE FmsT AMENDMENT §§ 2.01-4.11 (1984); Whitney
v. California. 274 U.S. 357 (1927) "[T)he freedom of speech which is secured by the
Constitution does not confer an absolute right to speak. without responsibility. whatever
one may choose. or an unrestricted and unbridled license giving immunity for every possible use of language • . . ." Whitney. 274 U.S. at 371 (Criminal Syndicalism Act held
not to be a restraint on the right of free speech). See generally J. Barron. C. Dienes,
HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH AND FREE PREss (1979) (hereinafter HANDBOOK).
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ual's right to free speech must be tempered by other interests of
society.22 Thus, the courts have developed restrictions on speech
in areas such as advocacy of unlawful conduct,23 speech deemed
to be "fighting words,"24 and obscene,211 commercial,2s and
libelous speech.27 Even when speech does not fit into one of
these categories, it can be regulated, provided the regulation is
content-neutral. These are the so-called time, place, and manner
regulations. 211 Two opposing views of freedom of speech emerged
during the development of the time, place, and manner regulations. The broad "liberal" view of freedom of speech was eloquently expressed by Justice Roberts in Hague v. Committee for
Industrial Organizations: 28
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest.
they have immemorially been held in trust for the
22. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 371. The Court stated in Whitney: "[A) state in the
exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to incite crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow by unlawful
means .•••" ld. (citing Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,666-68 (1925».
23. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). "[A state may) forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation [when) such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action." ld. at 447.
24. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (developed the "fighting
words" doctrine and upheld a statute construed to ban "face-to-face words plainly likely
to cause a breach of peace by the addressee"). ld. at 573-74. For refinements of the
doctrine see Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) (words conveying or intending to convey disgrace are not fighting words); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971) (fighting words doctrine can only be applied to face-to-face encounters); Terminiello, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (fighting words must present a clear and present danger before
government can intervene). See generally HANDBOOK, supra note 21 at 63-76; Rutzick,
Offensive Language and The Evolution of First Amendment Protection, 9 HARv. C.R. C. L. L. REV. 1 (1974).
25. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity is not protected by
the Constitution). See generally J. NOWAK, supra note 17 at 1011 (Material will be considered obscene if it "(a) appeals to a purient interest in sex, (b) has no serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific merit, and (c) is on the whole offensive to the average
person under contemporary community standards"). J. NOWAK, supra note 17 at 1011_
See generally HANDBOOK, supra note 21 at 607-69.
26. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) for the origin of commercial
speech analysis. See generally HANDBOOK, supra note 21 at 155-BO.
27. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (states may determine what
standard should be imposed in defamation actions involving private plaintiffs, but negligence is minimum requirement); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (recognizing a conditional privilege for libelous statements made by the press media with
respect to an elected public official).
28. See generally HANDBOOK, supra note 21 at 93-114.
29. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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use of the public and, time out of mind, have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of
the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of
citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United
States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but
relative, and must be exercised in subordination
to the general comfort and convenience, and in
consonance with peace and good order; but it
must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged
or denir1d. 3D
The more narrow restrictive view was set forth by Justice
Holmes in Davis v. Massachusetts: sl
For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to
forbid public speaking in a highway or public
park is no more an infringement of the rights of a
member of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house. When no proprietary right interferes, the legislature may end
the right of the public to enter upon the public
place by putting an end to the dedication to public uses. So it may take the less step of limiting
the public use to certain purposes.3lI
To strike a balance between the two opposing views, the
courts have developed the public forum analysis. ss This analysis
centers on the fact that speakers may possess certain rights enabling thein access to a particular forum to exercise their right to
free speech. With the public forum analysis, the courts have attempted to define those rights and provide guidance in determining when time, Dlace, and manner restrictions may be
imposed.
30. 1d. at 515·16.
31. 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
32. 1d. at 47.
33. See Cass, First .-lmendment Access to Government Facilities, 65 VA. 1.. REv.
1287 (1979) for a history of public forum analysis; See also Stone, Fora Americana:
Speech in Public Places, 1974 SUP. CT. REv. 233.
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Two recent Supreme Court cases34 attempted to extensively
catalogue the analysis of earlier decisions.3& In Perry Education
Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association,M the Court
observed that the existence of a right of access to public property and the standard by which limitations upon such a right are
evaluated will differ, depending on the character of the property
at issue. 37 In its analysis, the Court differentiated between three
types of forums to which the public's right of access varies, as
well as the restrictions the state may impose.

A.

PUBLIC FORUMS

Public forums encompass property which has historically
been held open for public use and devoted to assembly and debate. M The Perry Court noted that streets and parks are traditional public forums. 311 However, the courts have not enumerated
any specific principles to determine what other forms of public
property could be established as public forums. 4o As a result, ac34. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (the use
of public forum analysis to determine that teachers' mailboxes were non· public forums);
Cornelius v. NAACP, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (1985) (the use of public forum analysis to determine charity drive aimed at federal employees to be a non-public forum).
35. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (invalidating an ordinance which prohibited picketing on a public way adjacent. to a school while the school
was in session; the ordinance was found to regulate speech based on its content); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (student demonstration at. a county jail; conviction
of statutory crime of trespass upheld); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (student
demonstration in opposition to racial segregation conducted near courthouse; convictions
for breach of peace, obstruction of public passages and picketing all reversed).
36. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
37. Id. at 44. The issue before the Court was whether the first. amendment was violated when a teachers' exclusive bargaining representative was granted access to the District's interschool mail system, while such access was denied to a rival union. Id. at. 39.
The Court held that. the mail system was a non-public forum because it found that the
mail system was not. open for use by the general public although the school had granted
civic and church organizations periodic access. Id. at 46-47. The Court further held that
the School Board's regulation denying the rival union access was reasonable.ld. at 50-54.
The Court determined that the regulation was consistent with the School Board's legitimate interest in preserving the mail system's primary function of transmitting schoolrelated messages among teachers. Id. at 50·51. By enabling the union to effectively perform its obligations and prevent interunion conflicts in the schools, the mail system was
preserved for its intended purpose.ld.
38. Id. at 45.
39. Id. (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939» (recognizing the right of
access to a public forum predicated upon established common law notions of adverse
possession and public trust).
40. See Note, Public Forum Analysis After Perry Education AssociationlJ. Perry
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cess to a wide variety of public places has been the subject of
litigation. 41

United States v. Grace u explained that whether the property in question is generally open to the public is a factor to be
considered in forum analysis.u However, public property does
not become a public forum simply because the members of the
public are permitted to come and go at will.44
Justice Brennan's dissent in Lehman v. City of Shaker
H eights U recapitulates the standards relevant in determining
when public places will be considered public forums. According
to Justice Brennan, the Court must balance the interests of the
government with the interests of the speaker and his audience.
Accordingly, the Court must examine the primary use of the
public property and the extent to which that use will be disrupted if access for free expression is granted.· '
Once a public place is deemed a public forum, the general
public does not possess an unfettered constitutional right to use
the facility as it pleases.47 The restrictions the state may impose
upon communicative activity include time, place, and manner
Local Educators' &sociation • A Conceptual Approach to Clainu of First Amendment
Access to Publicly Owned Property, LIV FORDHAM 1.. REv. 545 (1986).
41. See United Stat,es Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburg, 453 U.s. 114 (1981)
(Jetterbox a non.public forum); Fernandez v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1981) (airport a public forum), cert. dismissed, 458 U.s. 1124 (1982); Albany Welfare Righta Org.
v. Wyman, 493 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1974) (welfare office waiting room a public forum),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.s. 298 (1974)
(advertising space on city rapid transit cars a non-public forum); Adderley v. Florida,
385 U.S. 39 (1966) (jail a non-public forum).
42. 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (public sidewalks forming the perimeter of the Supreme
Court grounds are public forums).
43. Id. at 171.
44.Id.
45. 418 U.s. 298 (1974) (advertising space on city rapid transit cars not a public
forum).
46. Id. at 312.
47. Cornelius v. NAACP, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 3448 (1985). Justice O'Connor stated:
Even protected speech is not equally permissible in all places
and at all times. Nothing in the Constitution requires the
Government freely to grant access to all who wish to exercise
their right to free speech on every type of government property without regard to the nature of the property or to the
disruption that might be caused by the speakers activities.
Id. at 3448.
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regulations which are content-neutral;u However. such regulations must serve a significant government interest!" In addition.
if the state imposes a restriction on the communicative activity.
the state must allow the speaker access to other methods of
communication.5O Finally. if the state seeks to exclude speech in
a public forum. based on its content. the state must show that a
compelling government interest requires such exclusion.lil
B.

LIMITED PUBLIC FORUMS

Limited public forums. also known as forums by designation. include public property which the government has opened
for the purpose of limited or certain expressive activity.li2 A limited public forum may be established for use by certain groups
for discussion of any topic. liS or open to the entire public for the
discussion of particular topics. 64 Once a limited public forum is
created. the right of access encompasses only those groups or
topics of similar character.1i1i
Cornelius v. NAACPM developed what is known as the
"government intent testn to determine whether the government
has intended to open a non-traditional forum for communicative
activity.1i'7 According to Cornelius. the courts must look to the
policy and practice of the government along with the nature of
48. Perry EdUc. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). See
generally HANDBOOK. supra note 21 at 93·114.
49. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
SO.Id.
51.Id.
52.Id.
53. Id. at 46 n.7 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)).
54. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7 (citing City of Madison v. Wisconsin, 429 U.S. 167
(1976».
55. Perry, 460 U.S. at 48. In Perry, the Court noted:
[w)hile the school mail facilities thus might be a forum gener·
ally open for use by the Girl Scouts, the local boys' club, and
other organizations that engage in activities of interest and
educational relevance to students, they would not as a conse·
quence be open to an organization such as [the rival union),
which is concerned with the terms and conditions of teachers
employment."
Id. See also Greer v. Spack, 424 U.S. 828, 838 n.10 (1976) (military reservation could
exclude political speeches while permitting lectures concerning drug abuse).
56. 105 S.Ct. 3439 (1985).
57. Id. at 3449.
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the property and its compatibility with expresssive activity."
Thus, a limited public forum will not be found if there is a clear
showing of a contrary intent. a • In addition, when the nature of
the property is not compatible with expressive activity, courts
will not designate a public forum. eo
In Widmar v. Vincent,81 a state university's express policy
generally afforded registered students access to its facilities. es
Therefore, the Court concluded that the university's facilites
were limited public forums generally open for use by student
groups only.es
As with public forums, reasonable time, place, and manner
limitations may be imposed in limited public forums, and a content based exclusion can be imposed if it serves a compelling
state interest. M As Justice Marshall stated in Police Department
of Chicago v. Mosley:e&
[G]overnment may not grant the use of a forum
58. Id. The issue in ComeliU8, was whether the first amendment was violated when
the federal government excluded legal defense and political advocacy organizations from
participating in the Combined Federal Campaign, a charity drive directed towards federal employees at their place of business. Id. at 3443. The Court held that the organizations' first amendment rights had not been violated by the exclusion. Id. at 3455. The
Court had to determine whether the forum to address was the federal workplace or the
charity drive. The Court stated that the correct forum was to be defined in temlS of the
access sought by the speaker and thereby rendered the charity drive as the forum at
issue. Id. at 3449. However, the Court further explained that it was necessary to examine
the special nature and function of the workplace when assessing its compatibilty with
expressive activity. I d.
The Court found the charity drive to be a non-public forum after applying the two
prong intent test.ld. at 3451. First, the Court found that neither the government's practice nor policy evinced an intent to open the charity drive as a public forum, for the
government consistently limited participation to voluntalJ agencies which it deemed appropriate. Id. at 3450-51. In addition, the government developed extensive admission
criteria to limit access to the forum. Id. at 3451. Second, the Court examined the nature
of the federal workplace and found that it existed to accomplish the employers' businesa.
Id. The Court concluded that the government had the right to exercise control over access to the federal workplace to avoid constant interruptions of the employees' performances. Id.
59. Id. at 3450.
SO.ld.
6t. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
62. Id. at 265.
63. Id. at 267.
64. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 4SO U.s. 37, 46 (1983).
65. 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (anti-picketing ordinance held unconstitutional on the
grounds that it discriminated among pickets based on the content of their expression).
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to people whose views it finds acceptable, but
deny use to those wishing to express less favored
or more controversial views.•.. [G]overnment
must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard. Once a forum is opened up to
. . . speaking by some groups, government may
not prohibit others from ... speaking on the basis of what they intend to say.&e

C.

NON PUBLIC FORUMS

Non-public forums constitute public properties which are
not traditional public forums or forums designated for communication.87 In International Society for Krishna Consciousness
v. New Jersey Sports and Exposition,S! the court held that a
race track and stadium did not constitute a public forum. 1III The
court noted that it would not be appropriate to declare a certain
location a public forum when the full' exercise of first amendment rights would be inconsistent with the primary use of the
property.10 Mter examining numerous Supreme Court decisions,ll the court stated that the race track did not fit into any
of the accepted descriptions of a public forum. 12
In Greer v. Spock," the Supreme Court found a military
reservation could constitutionally exclude political speeches and
66. Id. at 96.
67. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
68. 691 F.2d 155 (3d. Cir. 1982).
69. Id. at 158.
70. Id. at 160 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530, 540 (1980».
.
71. Int'Z Society, 691 F.2d at 160 (to determine whether property owned or controlled by the state is a public forum, the courts must first examine how the forum is
used); Hetl'ron v. Iskon, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (state fair a limited public forum because it exists to provide means of exhibition to large numbers of people); Jones v. North
Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (prison is not a public forum for its
inmates because the exercise of such free speech rights would conflict with the operations
of the prison); Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, (1975) (municipal theatres and auditoriums are designed for and dedicated to expressive activities).
72. Int'l Society, 691 F.2d at 161. The court reasoned that the stadium complex was
not analogous to traditional public forums such as street and parks, nor was the comple t
designed and created for expressive activity. Moreover, the court stated that the stadium
complex was a commercial venture created by the state designed to generate revenue.
Id.
73. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
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distribution of leaflets in two areas open to the general public.7•
The Court stated that the basic function of a military reservation is to train soldiers, not to provide a public forum.7& As
stated by Justice Stewart, "[t]he notion that federal military
reservations, like municipal streets or parks, have traditionally
served as a place for free public assembly and communication of
thoughts by private citizens is thus historically and constitutionally false."7s Accordingly, the nature and purpose of the military
reservation was not found to be compatible with the expressive
activity sought to be communicated. 77
In non-public forums, states may impose the same reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions that are permitted in
the traditional and limited public forums. 78 Moreover, access to
a non-public forum may be restricted to preserve the forum for
its intended purpose if the regulation is reasonable and not
based on opposition to the speaker's view. 78 The reasonableness
of a regulation must be assessed in light of the purpose of the
forum and all the surrounding circumstances,80 thereby reserving the forum for its intended purpose.'1 To preserve the nonpublic forum for activities compatible with its intended purpose,
the state may make distinctions regarding access on the basis of
74. ld. at 838.
75. ld. at 834.
76. ld. at 838.
77. ld. at 838 n.10. The court noted that even though civilian lectures on drug abuse
and religious services had taken place on the base, this fact did not of itself convert the
base into a public forum to allow political candidates the right to campaign on the b~_
ld.
78. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Loca1 Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (citing
United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburg, 453 U.S. 114, 131 n.7 (1981)).
79. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
SO. Cornelius v. NAACP, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 3453 (1985).
81. Perry 460 U.S. at 46. "(T)he State, no less than a private owner of property, has
power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated." ld. (quoting United Stotell POIItol Serv., 453 U.s. at 129-30, quoting Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976), quoting Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966». See
also Cornelius v. NAACP, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (1985). Legal defense fund organizations
brought suit alleging the federal government violated their first amendment rights when
it excluded them from participating in the Combined Federal Campaign, a charity drive
aimed at federal employees. CorneliUII, 105 S.Ct. at 3443. The Supreme Court held the
federal government had not violated the legal defense funds first amendment rights. Cornelius, 105 S.Ct. at 3455: The Court held that the charity drive was a non-public forum,
therefore, the government's desire to avoid political favortism was a valid justification to
exclude the group, as was the desire to minimize disruption of the work place. CorneliUII,
105 S. Ct. at 3451.
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subject matter and speaker identity.82 However, when making
such distinctions, reasonable grounds for denial of access will
not sanctify a regulation that is in reality a facade for viewpointbased discrimination. 83

D.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH IN THE
CONTEXT OF HIGH SCHOOLS

When dealing with first amendment rights and their limitations in schools, courts have developed the principle that first
amendment rights must be considered in light of the special circumstances of the school environment.84 In Tinker v. Des
Moines School District,8G three high school students had been
suspended from school for wearing black arm bands in protest of
the Vietnam war. 86 In holding that the students' conduct was
protected by the free speech clause of the first amendment,S?
and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,88 the
United States Supreme Court found that first amendment rights
are available to students. 811 As stated by the Court, "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital
than in the community of American schools."" The Court noted
that the judiciary has consistently affirmed the position that
school officials must be given full authority to prescribe and control conduct in the school,1I1 yet this authority must not abridge
fundamental constitutional safeguards afforded to the students. 92 Tinker set forth a test to determine whether a restriction on an expressive activity is justified.1I3 A restriction is justified when the activity "materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."94 Thus,
the Court found that because the students' protest was not dis82. Perry. 460 U.S. at 49.
83. Cornelius. 105 S.CL at 3454.
84. Tinker v. Des Moines School DisL. 393 U.S. 503. 506 (1969).
85. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
86. rd. at 504.
87. rd. at 50S-OS.
88. rd.
89. rd. at 506.
90. rd. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents. 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). quoting Shelton v. Tucker. 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960».
91. Tinker. 393 U.S. at 507.
92. rd.
93. rd. at 513.
94. [d.
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ruptive of the school environment or of other students' rights, ell
the School Board violated the students' right to free speech."
When embarking on a forum analysis of access claims to
schools and their environs, the court must identify and examine
the nature of the property at issuee7 and its compatibility with
expressive activity." Additionally, the court must examine the
school board's policies and practices to determine the type of
forum the board intended to create." Therefore, it is important
to note that it may not be possible to apply a ~ingle rule across
the board as to the type of forum a school and its environs will
be classified. Access claims vary according to the particular forum sought to be utilized, and the policies and practices of the
school boards differ depending on the forum. loo
In Grayned v. City of Rockford,lol the Court held that
members of the general public may be afforced access to the
public sidewalks surrounding a high school campus for expressive activity, provided that activity falls within the guidelines set
by Tinker. los Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court, espoused
95. ld. at 514. ''The record does not demonstrate any facts which might have reasonably led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities, and no disturbances or disorders on the schoolpremises in
fact occurred." ld.
96.ld.
97. Cornelius v. NAACP, lOS S.Ct. 3139, 3446 (1985).
98. ld. at 3449.
99. ld. As stated by the Court in CorneliU8:
The government does not create a public forum by inaction or
by permitting limited discourse. but only by intentionally
opening a non-traditional forum for public discourse. Accordingly, the Court has looked to the policy and practice of the
government to ascertain whether it intended to designate a
place not traditionally open to assembly and debate as a public forum.
ld.
100. See Perry EdUc. Asa'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.s. 37 (1983).
101. 408 U.s. 104 (1972).
102. Grayned, 408 U.s. at 121. In Grayned, students, family members and friends,
totaling approximately two hundred people, took part in a demonstration which was
planned after school administrators did not respond to students' complaints. ld. at lOS.
Grayned had been arrested and convicted for participating in the demonstration in violation of an anti·picketing ordinance and an anti-noise ordinance. ld. at 106. Grayned
challenged the constitutionality of the ordinances but did not insist that the ordinances
had violated constitutionally protected activity. ld.
The anti· picketing ordinance, which the Court held to violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the fourteenth amendment, provided that: "A person commits disorderly con-
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the broad, liberal view of Justice Roberts in Hague/os stating
that free expression "must not, in the guise of regulation, be
abridged or denied."I04 Justice Marshall relied on Tinker in recognizing the need to apply first amendment rights in accordance
with the special characteristics of the school environment. lOG He
re-emphasized that "wide exposure to [the1 robust exchan&e of
ideas is an 'important part of the educational process and should
be nurtured' ".loe Thus, as with Tinker, the Grayned Court
stated that free expression by students should not be barred
from the school campUS. 107 Noting that the general public does
not have an absolute right of access to schools or their environs,l08 the Court applied Tinker and declared that curtailing
the general public's free speech may be permitted only if such
expressive activity "materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."lo~ Justice Marshall explained that a determination must be made as to
whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with
the normal activity of the particular place at a particular time to
warrant curtailing the public's free speech. 110 The narrow restrictive view of Justice Holmes is evidenced in Student Coalition for Peace v. Lower Merion School District. 111 In Student
Coalition, a non-school sponsored student organization l12 sought
duct when he knowingly: (i) Pickets or demonstrates on a public way within ISO feet of
any primary or secondary school building while the school is in session and one-half hour
before the school is in session and one-half hour after the school session has been concluded, provided that this subsection does not prohibit peaceful picketing of any school
involved in a labor dispute __ .... ld. at 107.
The anti-noise ordinance which the Court upheld as constitutional, provided in part:
"No person, while on public or private grounds adjacent to any building in which a
school or any class thereof is in session, shall willfully make or assist in the making of
any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order of such
school session or class thereof ...... ld. at 107-08.
103. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
104. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 117 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939».
lOS. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 117.
1(\5. ld. at 117 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512
(1969».
107. Groyned, 408 U.S. at 117.
108. ld. at 117-18.
109. ld. at 118 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513
(1969».
110. Groyned, 408 U.S. at 116. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (silent
vigil will not interfere with a public library).
Ill. 776 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1985).
112. ld. at 433. The organization was dedicated to the cause of world peace through
nuclear disarmament. ld.
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access to the high school's athletic field to stage a Peace Fair.us
Though the field had been regularly used for non-school community events,114 the court determined that the field had not been
designated as a forum for community events. 11II In finding a nonpublic forum,118 the court concluded that the School Board's decision to deny the organization access to the field was reasonable.ll7 The court based its conclusion on the School Board's desire "to keep the 'podium of politics off school grounds' "118 and
to maintain an appearance of neutrality.1JI) The court noted that
the Board's decision would be upheld as reasonable even if its
fears of potentially disruptive political controversy proved to be
unfounded. 120
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

A THE

MAJORITY

1. Newspapers as Limited Public Forums

The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by discussing whether
the school newspapers were public, limited, or non-public forums. 1I1 To make this determination, the court focused on the
intent of the School Board as evidenced by the Board's publication policies and practices as well as the nature of the newspapers and their compatibility with expressive activity.122 The
court found that by their very nature, school newspapers are devoted entirely to expressive activity, since everything that appears in the newspaper is speech. 123 The court concluded that
newspapers were the type of property most compatible with ex113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id. at 433·34.
Id. at 437.
Id. The court in Student Coalition based its decision upon two factors: 1) The

School Board's policy required that non·school sponsored organizations obtain permis·
sion to use the field. 2) The athletic field was not created for expressive activity. Id.
117. Ill.
118. Id.
119. Id. CI Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (justifiable restriction on expressive activity when it "materially disrupts class work or involves substantial order or invasion of rights of others") Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
120. Student Coalition, 776 F.2d at 437.
121. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1476.
122. See Cornelius v. NAACP, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 3449 (1985).
123. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1476.
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pressive activity.124
The court ultimately found that the Board created a limited
public forum in the newspapers in two respects, as evidenced by
the Board's policies and practices. 125 First, the Board allowed a
certain group, the students, access to the newspapers to discuss
any topic,128 thereby creating a limited public forum similar to
that in Widmar.12'1 Second, the Board's policy governing the
newspapers also entitled the general public access to the newspapers with the only content limits ueing that the advertisements had to offer goods, services, or vocational opportunities to
the students. 128 Therefore, the court reasoned, the Board's intent to create a limited public forum was established. 1211
Having determined that the school newspapers constituted
a limited public forum to which the right of access encompassed
only those topics of similar character, the court found that the
issue narrowed itself to a debate over the particular limitations
the Board could impose on the topics the nonstudents wished to
discuss in the newspaper. 130
The court first examined the military ads the Board allowed
to be published. l3l Agreeing with the district court, the Ninth
Circuit found that the military ads published in the newspapers
were vocational or career ads. us But the Ninth Circuit further
held that the district court erred when it found that the military
recruitment ads were nonpolitical. l33 In reaching this conclusion,
the court reasoned that the government's interest in promoting
124. ld.
125. ld.
126. ld. Students were subject to certain conditions which were not relevant to the
issue before the court. [d.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
128. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1476.
129. [d. See also City of Madison School Dist. v. Wisconsin, 429 U.S. 167 (1976)
(limited public forum open to the entire public for the discussion of certain topics).
130. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1476. The Board contended that its policies permitted nor·students to engage only in non-political commercial speech. [d. at 1476-77.
The Board also claimed that the military service advertisements were non-political, but
CARD's advertisements were not. [d. at 1477. The District Court found that the military
service advertisements (1) offered vocational or career opportunities to students and (2)
were non-political. [d.
131. ld. at 1477.
132. [d.
133.ld.
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military service is not based on economics, rather, it is essentially political or governmental. 134 The court reviewed the history of military service and found it to be both controversial and
political in nature,m thereby negating the totally commercial aspect of the military ads. 13s Thus, the military ads printed in the
school newspapers presented one side of a political dispute. 137
Through this analysis, the court found that the Board's actual
policy permitted nonstudents to engage in speech which is both
political and commercial, at least in respect to the military service topic itself.13s "Having established a limited public forum,
the Board [could] not, absent a compelling government interest,
e~dude speech otherwise within the boundaries of the forum."13e
No such interest was found to exist here. 140 Therefore, since
CARD's advertisements were composed of the same political and
commercial speech as the permitted military advertisements, the
Board's exclusion of CARD's advertisements violated CARD's
first amendment rights. l4l

2. Newspapers as Non-Public Forums
In the alternative, the Ninth Circuit held that even if the
school newspapers were non-public forums, the Board nevertheless violated CARD's first amendment right to free speech. 142
The court held that the Board's conduct denying CARD access
to publish its ads was unreasonable and constituted viewpointbased discrimination.143
134. ld.
135. ld. The court noted that opposition to military service has been pres<!nt
throughout the nation's history. See, e.g. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965)
(discussing the history of conscientious objection). The student protests over military
service in the late 1960's and 1970's also reflected the controversy. See also In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945) (attorney could be denied admission to state bar because of his
opposition to military service).
136. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1478.
137. ld. at 1477.
138. ld. at 1478 (emphasis in original).
139.ld.
140. ld.
141. ld. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983)
(once a limited public forum is established, the constitutional right of access extends
only to other entities of similar character).
142. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1478.
143. ld.
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In a non-public forum, restrictions on speech are upheld if
they are reasonable and are not an attempt to engage in viewpoint discrimination. 144 The court, nevertheless, rejected all
three of the Board's arguments that its exclusion of CARD's advertisements was reasonable.1411
First, the court rejected the Board's contention that the advertisements' political character was a reasonable basis for exclusion. wl The court stressed that because the published military advertisements were not solely non-political, but were in
fact, of a mixed political and commercial nature,147 the Board
could not reasonably exclude CARD's advertisements when they
pertained to the same politically controversial subject matter. UI
Concerning the Board's second contention, that publication
of the advertisements would promote non-registration for the
draft, amounting to an illegal act, the court held that the Board
could not imply that CARD sought to promote illegal activity
based on its name alone. u • The court noted that a state could
prevent an individual's activities which are geared toward inciting or producing imminent lawless action where it is likely that
illegal conduct will result. 1l10 However, since the Board did not
produce any evidence to substantiate this claim, the court concluded that denying CARD access to the newspapers on the basis of speculation1ll1 was unreasonable. I112
144. See supra text accompanying notes 73-83.
145. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1480.
146. rd. at 1479.
147. rd.
148. rd. The Board's asserted policy allowed for restricting the publication of ads
proffered by non-students, to non-political advertisements offering goods, services or
vocational opportunities to students. rd. at 1476-77.
149. rd. at 1479.
150. rd. (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969». The Court in Brandenburg reversed the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader for violating Ohio's Criminal
Syndicalism Statute which prohibited the advocation of political reform t.'lrough violence
and the formation of groups formed to teach criminal syndicalism. Brandenburg, 395
U.S. at 444-45. The Court held that "[The state may not) forbid or proscribe advocacy of
the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Brandenburg, 395 U.s. at 447.
151. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1479. The record disclosed the Board derived
their allegation solely on the basis of CARD's name. rd. See Gay Students v. Bonner, 509
F.2d 652, 662 (1st Cir. 1974) (speculation that an individual may at sometime engage in
illegal conduct is insufficient to justify a regulation).
152. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1479. "To the contrary, the record indicated that
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The court also rejected the Board's argument that the advertis~ment exclusion was predicated out of desire to allow the
students to utilize the newspapers as a forum for their own free
expression, rather than as a forum for a host of nonstudent
groups.m The court acknowledged that, practically speaking,
the Board may impose access limits on the amount of nonstudent materials, but such restrictions may not be imposed arbitrarily or unreasonably.la4 The court found that the Board's
treatment of CARD's advertisement was arbitrary because the
Board was unable to distinguish how publication of CARD's advertisements would diminish the students' right of access, while
the military advertisements would not do so.m Moreover, the
Board did not present any objective system for limiting or
choosing ads concerning the same subject matter.1M Thus, the
court found that the Board was unable to offer any reasonable
basis upon which to justify the exclusion. Ja7
Finally, the court held that the Board had exercised viewpoint-based discrimination because it had not provided a valid
basis for denying CARD access to the same forum as that utilized by the military advertisements. las The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the only inference that could be drawn from the
Board's publication of only pro-military recruitment advertise.ments was that the Board was barring CARD's anti-draft ads
because of their content or message. Jail Since the Supreme Court
CARD, through its advertisement, sought. to apprise eligible st.udents of legitimate and
lawful alternatives to the draft, such as the availabilit.y of student deferments." Id.
153. Id. at 1480.
154. Id.
155.1d.
156. Id.
157. !d.
158. Id. at. 1481.
159. Id. See City of Madison v. Wisconsin, 429 U.s. 167 (1976) (School Board meeting open to the public; held, non-union teacher Iud the right to speak even though the
subject. pertained to pending collective bargaining negotiations). The Court stated: "To
permit one side of a debatable public question to have a monopoly in expressing its
views ••• is the antithesis of constitutional guarantees... City of Madison, 429 U.s. at
175-76. See elso Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.s. 92 (1972) (city ordinance
prohibiting all picketing within one hundred and fifty feet of school except peaceful
picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute held to be discriminatory). The Court
in Mosley stated that "the first amendment means that government has no power to
re'Jtrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject. matter, or its content."
Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95.
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had previously held in Cornelius lso that such viewpc: nt-based
discrimination is impermissible, even in a non-public forum,161
this provided the majority with a second ground for finding the
Board's actions violated the first amendment. lu
B.

DISSENT

Judge Wallace challenged the majority's conclusion that the
Board's acceptance of the military ads created a limited public
forum from which CARD's advertisements could not r? excluded. us The dissent argued that the majority ignored the
"teachings" of Cornelius. IN It concluded that the school papers
constituted a non-public forum and that the restrictions the
Board sought to impose on CARD's advertisements were reasonable.l8II However, Judge Wallace believed that a remand was
necessary in order to determine specifically whether the Board's
rejection constituted viewpoint-based discrimination. ISS
Judge Wallace began his analysis by focusing on the issue of
the identification of the forum itself.ls7 He asserted that the correct forum at issue was not the newspapers in general, but
rather, the newspaper advertising spaces, since CARD sought access only to the particular advertising spaces. u ,
Applying the Cornelius intent test,ISe the dissent argued
that the Board's policies and practices did not .'epresent an intention to grant general access to the newspapers' advertising
spaces.170 Judge Wallace relied on the Board's policy which gave
the publication staff and advisor discretion to publish paid advertisements by nonstudents, if they dE'termined that the advertisements would advance the newspapers' "primary purposes
160. 105 S.Ct 3439 (1985).
161. Id. at 3554.
162. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1481.
163. Id. at 1483.
164.ld.
165. Id. at 1485.
166. Id.
167. See Cornelius v. NAACP, lOS S.Ct. 3439, 3449 (1985) (defining forum according
to access Bought by the speaker).
168. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1483.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 56·60.
170. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1483-84.
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sufficiently to warrant publication."1'11 Judge Wallace reasoned
that this policy, coupled with the practice of limiting advertisements to those offering goods, services, or vocational opportunities to students, indicated the Board did not intend to create a
limited public forum. m
Applying the second prong of the Cornelius intent test, the
dissent argued that the purposes of the advertising spaces were
to teach students journalistic management and to help finance
the publication of the newspapers, not to create a forum for expressive activity for nonstudents.l'lS Therefore, the Board's policy enabling it to exclude CARD's advertisements should be upheld, in order to avoid disrupting the educational proc:3S.174
Finally, the dissent rejected the majority's contention that
"if speech admitted in a forum relates to a 'controversial and
political issue', the government has created a limited public forum that encompasses the issue."1'11! Judge Wallace argued that
such a test is in conflict with the government intent test set out
in Cornelius.1'18 The dissent asserted that if the majority's test
were applied to Cornelius, health and welfare services would be
considered "controversial and political", thereby opening up the
campaign into a limited public forum from which legal defense
and political advocacy organizations could not be excluded. 177
"This result was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in
Cornelius.1'18
Having concluded that the school newspapers constituted a
171. Id. at 1484.
172. Id. at 1483·84. See also ComelilU, 105 S.Ct. 3439. "(S]elective access, unsupported by evidence of a purposeful designation for public use. does not create a public
forum." Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3451.
173. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1484. (There is no evidence in the record that
the Board advanced this argument).
174. Id. Justice Wallace stated: "(O]ur obligation to apply First Amendment rights
'in light of the special characteristics of the school environment' n, (citing T'.niter v. Des
Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969», "requires that we aW?;it 'school policies
that are reasonably designed to :::!jttllt those rights to th~ !::;cds of the school environ·
ment.' .. (citing Nicholson v. Board of Education, 682 F.2d 858, 863 (9th Cir. 1982». San
Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1484.
175. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1484.
176.ld.
177. Id.
178. 105 S.Ct. 3439 (l!l85).
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non-public forum,179 Judge Wallace applied the Cornelius test to
determine when restrictions on access to such a forum will be
upheld. 180 Judge Wallace argued that the Board's denial of access to the newspapers was reasonable, for it was designed to
avoid disruption in the school. 181 Though the School Board did
not argue that publication of CARD's advertisement would
cause disruption in the school, Judge Wallace stated that the
Board was acting pursuant to a policy which was developed to
limit disruption.182
While Judge Wallace agreed that military recruitment ads
may tender political implications, he chose to follow the standard of review applicable to restrictions in non-public forums as
set out in Student Coalition for Peace v. Lower Merion School
District. 18s Under that test, a School Board need only draw a
reasonable line between political and non-political speech.1M
The dissent concluded that the military ads were non-political
and CARD's ads could reasonably be excluded as political. 1811
The dissent objected to the majority's inference that the
Board's refusal of CARD's advertisements constituted viewpoint-based discrimination,188 since it found the military ads to
be non-political. 187 However, Judge Wallace stated that because
none of the district court's findings explicitly addressed this issue, a specific finding on viewpoint-based discrimination should
be deteTmined on remand. 1M

179. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1484.
180. Id. at 1483-84.

181. Id at 1485.
182. Id. at 1485 n.2.
183. 776 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1985). In Student Coalition the court maintained that
the School Board was not required to delineate with absolute clarity the distinction between activities imposing political messages and those imposing non-political messages.
Id. at 437. The line drawn need only be reasonable and not a Cacade Cor viewpoint discrimination. Id. Thus, an activity which may have an implicit political message, may be
deemed non-political when 8uch message is 8ubsidiary to other aspects oC the activity_ld.
184.ld.
185. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1485.
186.ld.
187. 1d.
188.ld.
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V. CRITIQUE
A

LIMITED PUBLIC FORUM

The Ninth Circuit correctly followed precedent in holding
that the School Board violated CARD's first amendment rights.
The court properly concluded both that the school newspapers
were limited public forums, and based on this, that the Board
violated CARD's constitutional rights by refusing it access to the
forum. By focusing on access to the school newspapers in general, rather than to the advertising spaces in particular, the majority ignored the dicta of Cornelius v. NAACpI .. that the
courts must "take a more tailored approach to ascertaining the
perimeters of a forum within the confines of the government
property."l~ Nevertheless, the majority correctly applied the
Cornelius intent test and properly held that the school newspapers were a limited public forum.
The first prong of the Cornelius intent test involves an analysis of the government's policy and practice towards the forum
at issue,,·l Here the Board's admitted policy was to allow the
general public access to publish advertisements provided they
offered goods, services, or vocational opportunities to the students. In However, since the Board allowed, on a number of oc"casions, mixed commercial and political advertisements pertaining to military service to be published in the newspapers, ItS its
actual policy evinced an intent to open the forum for such
speech. It must be noted that the court in San Diego CARD explicitly narrowed its holding to mixed commercial and political
advertisements dealing only with military services. I ...
Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association1e& can be distinguished from San Diego CARD. In
Perry, the Court determined that a school mail system was a
non-public forum for the School Board's policy and practice did
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

105 S.Ct. 3439 (1985).
[d. at 3449.
See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1476.
[d. at 1478.

194. [d.

195. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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not render the mail system open to the general public. l98 Rather,
the school had restricted its use to official business with very few
exceptions. a7 Consequently, use of the system by an organization affiliated with the school, such as the teachers' exclusive
bargaining union, did not convert the mail system into a limited
public forum. lea In San Diego CARD, however, the Board's admitted policy was to allow outside entities regular access to the
newspaper advertising spaces.l~

San Diego CARD can also be distinguished from the nonpublic forum found in Cornelius. In Cornelius, the government
had developed extensive admission criteria and had consistently
limited participation of groups soliciting funds in a charity drive
conducted at a federal workplace.'oo In addition, the Court
found that the federal workplace was not consistent with expressive activity.lol In San Diego CARD, the S :hool Board had not
developed an extensive or objective system for limiting the number of advertisements to be published. lol Furthermore, a school
newspaper is a conduit for the dissemination of ideas20ll and
serves as a communication channel for "wide exposure to [the]
robust exchange of ideas."204 Thus, student newspapers are an
important aspect of the educational process and are intimately
compatible with expressive activity.
The dissent in San Diego CARD lost sight of Cornelius
when applying the second prong of the intent test. Judge Wallace did not focus on the nature of the school newspapers in
which the advertisements were contained, as Cornelius requires. 2OII Rather, Judge Wallace focused on the nature of the
196. Id. at 47.
197.ld.
198. Id. at 46·48.
199. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1476.
200. Cornelius v. NAACP, 105 S.Ct 3439, 3451 (1985).
201. Id.
202. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1480.
203. See Gambino v. Faitfax City School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Va 1977) (high
sehool newspaper a public forum publication of article concerning birth control could not
be suppressed solely because the School Board did not deem it appropriate course content), aff'd, 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977). See also Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102
(1969) (high sehool students were entitled to place advertisements in opposition to Vietnam war in the school newspaper).
204. Tinker v. Des Moines School DisL, 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969).
205. See supra notes 56·60 and accompanying texL
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advertising spaces specifically, thereby limiting his analysis on
the compatibility issue.
The dissent erroneously stated that the majority purported
to introduce a test in direct conflict with the Cornelius intent
test. 2M In summarizing the majority's conclusion that the school
newspapers constituted a limited public forum, Judge Wallace
stated U[t]he majority's ... conclusion rests on its mistaken be·
lief that if speech admitted in a forum relates to a 'controversial
and political' issue, the government has created a limited public
forum that encompasses the issue.''207 However, the majority did
not rest its conclusion on such a test. As explained, the court
properly applied the two prong test of Cornelius. SOl In keeping
with the analysis in Perry,2OS when the government has cre:lted a
limited public forum open to the general public for a discussion
of certain topics, the constitutional right of access encompasses
only those topics of similar character.21o Military service, the
topic of "CARD's advertisement, clearly fell within the perime·
ters of the limited public forum since military service advertise·
ments had previously been published.
Having found a limited public forum encompassing political
military advertisements, the court correctly held that the Board
violated CARD's first amendment rights when it denied CARD
access, since the Board failed to advance a compelling govern·
ment interest for its actions. 211
B.

NON-PUBLIC FORUMS

Even if the student newspapers were non-public forums, the
court correctly held that the Board's restrictions on access were
unreasonable and constituted viewpoint-based discrimination.s12
The Perry Court explained that regulations must be assessed in
light of the purpose of the forum and all the surrounding circumstances in order to preserve the forum for its intended pur206. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1484.
207.Id.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 121-129.
209. 460 U.s. 37 (1983).
210. Id. at 48.
211. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at" 1478. See supra text accompanying notes
212. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d at 1478.
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pose.213 Applying the test set out in Tinker v. Des Moines
School District,2J.· the School Board did not produce any evidence to prove that granting publication of CARD's advertisements would materially disrupt classwork or involve substantial
disorder or invade the rights of others. 216 In addition, since the
purpose of the advertising spaces was to offer goods, services. or
educational opportunities to the students, CARD's advertisements would not have interfered with the purpose of the newspapers Co2 communicative channels.
Purporting to rely on Cornelius, the dissent maintained that
CARD's advertisements could reasonably be excluded to avoid
disruption in the schools.:ns In Cornelius, the Court stated that
"[g]overnment need not wait until havoc is wreaked to restrict
access in a non-public forum. un7 However, broad assertions of
possible disruptions must be substantiated with evidence,
though that evidence need not be conclusive. 218 The Court in
Cornelius found that enough evidence was presented to show
that the continued participation of the advocacy groups in the
charity drive would be detrimental to the Campaign and disruptive of the federal workplace. 21 \) However, in San Diego CARD,
no evidence was offered to substantiate the claim that CARD's
advertisement would cause disruption in the schools.220

San Diego CARD can also can be distinguished from the
other key case relied upon by the dissent, Student Coalition for
Peace v. Lower Merion School District.2S1 In that case, the
Board sought to deny a political student group access to the
school's athletic field in order to maintain the appearance of
neutrality.222 The court in Student Coalition reasoned that since
the Board had not allowed any other political groups access, the
Board could then reasonably exclude the politically oriented
213. Perry 460 U.S. at 46. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
214. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
215. San Diego CARD, 790 F.2d. at 1480 n.10.
216. Id. at 1485.
217. 105 S.Ct. at 3453.
218. Id. at 3453·54.
219. Id. Evidence presented included letters from employees, managers and memo
bers of Congress expressing concern over admittance of the organizations, over one thou·
sand telephone complaints. and a decline in the number of contributions. Id.
220. San Diego CARD, 7pl1 F.2d at 1480 n.l0.
221. 776 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1985).
222. Id. at 437.
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Peace Fair.223 In San Diego CARD, the School Board did not
exclude all politically controversial advertisements from publication. Therefore, since one side of the politically controversial
question of military service was espoused, neutrality was lost.
There could then be no justification for the exclusion of CARD's
viewpoint. 224
VI. CONCLUSION
In San Diego CARD, the Ninth Circuit found that an antidraft organization's first amendment rights were violated when
it was denied access to publish advertisements in several high
school newspapers. The conflict presented by the majority and
dissenting opinions reflects the long standing battle between
those holding a liberal view of first amendment freedoms and
those adhering to a more restrictive approach. The majority's
liberal approach, upholding the right of free speech, is essential
in the school context, for it is in the schools where our nation's
young are first introduced to our democratic system. Students
must be allowed the freedom to assimilate unpopular and controversial views to fully develop their own political beliefs and
values. An understanding of this principal seems to underlie the
majority opinion in San Diego CARD.

Maureen Mullane·

223.Id.
224. See also Greer v. Spock. 424 U.s. 828 (1976). In Greer, the Court found a regulation banning political speeches and demonstrations on a military base to be reasonable
and not view-point-based discrimination. Id.at 838-40. The purpose of the base was to
train soldiers, and like the school policy in Student Coalition, Fort Dix's policy did not
allow for any partisan political campaigns on the base. [d. at 839. Therefore, it could not
be said that the base was discriminating against one particular viewpoint since no political viewpoints were granted access. Ill. at 838-839. (emphasis added).
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1988.
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